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Abstract
We propose a general system that combines the powerful features of
modal logic and many-sorted reasoning. Its algebraic semantics leads to a
many-sorted generalization of boolean algebras with operators, for which
we prove the analogue of the Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem. Our goal was to
deepen the connections between modal logic and program verification,
and we test the expressivity of our system by defining a small imperative
language and its operational semantics.
Keywords: Polyadic modal logic, many-sorted logic, boolean algebras with
operators, many-sorted algebras, Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem, operational se-
mantics.
1 Introduction
In this paper we define a many-sorted polyadic modal logic, together with its
corresponding algebraic theory. The idea is not new: in [14, 15] two-sorted
systems are analyzed and we used them as references for our approach, while
in [7, 9, 13] a general theory is developed in a coalgebraic setting. However, to
our knowledge, the general framework presented in this paper is new.
Our language is determined by a fixed, but arbitrary, many-sorted signature
and a set of many-sorted propositional variables. The transition from mono-
sorted to many-sorted setting is a smooth process and we follow closely the
developments from [1]. We define appropriate frames and models, the gener-
alized construction of the canonical model and we prove the completeness of
our results. The distinction between local and global deduction from the mono-
sorted setting is deepened in our version: locally we consider only hypotheses
of the same sort, while globally the set of hypotheses is a many-sorted set. The
global deduction is analyzed in a distinct section, where we also prove a corre-
sponding generalization of the deduction theorem. In order to investigate the
algebraic completeness, we introduce a many-sorted generalization of boolean
algebras with operators and we prove the analogue of Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem.
We mention that similar structures were defined in [7], but in that case the
operators are unary operations while, in our setting, they have arbitrary arities.
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While the transition from the mono-sorted logic to a many-sorted one is a
smooth process, we see our system as a step towards deepening the connection
between modal logic and program verification, and we test its expressivity in
the last section.
Our research was inspired by Matching logic [12], a logic for program spec-
ification and verification, in which one can represent the mono-sorted polyadic
modal logic. The propositional calculus defined in this paper can be seen as the
propositional counterpart of Matching logic.
In Section 2 we follow a standard approach in order to define the canonical
model and to prove the completeness theorem. In this section only the local
deduction is considered. Section 3 is dedicated to global deduction. Section
4 contains the algebraic semantics. In Section 5 we relate our system with
Matching logic and we further compare our approach with similar systems from
[15, 14, 2]. Finally, in the last section, we define within our logic, both the
syntax and the operational semantics of a small imperative language such that
program execution is modeled as logical inference.
2 The many-sorted polyadic modal logic MLS
In this section we follow closely the development of the polyadic modal logic
from [1]. Fixing a many-sorted signature (S,Σ) we investigate the general the-
ory of many-sorted modal logics based on (S,Σ). For these systems we define
the syntax, the semantics, the local deduction, the canonical model and we
prove the completeness results. Our system is a generalization of the two-sorted
modal logic defined in [15]. Some proofs in the paper are straightforward gen-
eralizations of the mono-sorted case; however we sketch them in order to keep
the paper self-contained.
2.1 Formulas, frames and models
Let (S,Σ) be a many-sorted signature. A set of S-sorted variables is an S-sorted
set P = {Ps}s∈S such that Ps 6= ∅ for any s ∈ S and Ps1 ∩ Ps2 = ∅ for any
s1 6= s2 in S.
An (S,Σ)-modal language ML(S,Σ)(P ) is built up using the many-sorted
signature (S,Σ) and a set of propositional variables P .
In the sequel we assume (S,Σ) and P are fixed. For brevity,ML(S,Σ)(P ) will
be denoted MLS . For any n ∈ N we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n} and Σs1...sn,s =
{σ ∈ Σ | σ : s1 . . . sn → s} for any s, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S.
Definition 2.1. The set of formulas of MLS is an S-indexed family FormS =
{Forms}s∈S inductively defined as follows:
• Ps ⊆ Forms for any s ∈ S,
• if φ1 ∈ Forms then ¬φ1 ∈ Forms for any s ∈ S,
• if φ1, φ2 ∈ Forms then φ1 ∨ φ2 ∈ Forms for any s ∈ S,
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• if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s and φ1 ∈ Forms1 , . . . , φn ∈ Formsn then σ(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈
Forms.
As usual, for any s ∈ S, φ1, φ2 ∈ Forms we set φ1∧φ2 := ¬(¬φ1∨¬φ2) and
φ1 → φ2 := ¬φ1 ∨ φ2. For any s ∈ S and a fixed p ∈ Ps we define ⊥s:= p ∧ ¬p
and ⊤s = ¬ ⊥s. Moreover, if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s is a non-nullary operation and
φi ∈ Formsi for any i ∈ [n], the dual operation is
σ(φ1, . . . , φn) := ¬σ(¬φ1, . . . ,¬φn).
In order to define the semantics we introduce the (S,Σ)-frames as S-sorted
relational structures.
Definition 2.2. An (S,Σ)-frame is a tuple F = (W ,R) such that:
• W = {Ws}s∈S is an S-sorted set of worlds and Ws 6= ∅ for any s ∈ S,
• R = {Rσ}σ∈Σ such that Rσ ⊆Ws×Ws1× . . .×Wsn for any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s.
If F is an (S,Σ)-frame, then an (S,Σ)-model based on F is a pairM = (F , ρ)
where ρ : P → P(W) is an S-sorted valuation function such that ρs : Ps → P(Ws)
for any s ∈ S. The model M = (F , ρ) will be simply denoted byM = (W ,R, ρ).
Following [1], if C is a set of frames then we say that a model M is from C
if it is based on a frame from C.
In the sequel we define the satisfaction relation.
Definition 2.3. Let M = (W ,R, ρ) be an (S,Σ)-model, s ∈ S, w ∈ Ws and
φ ∈ Forms. We define M, w |
s
= φ
by induction over φ as follows:
• M, w |
s
= p iff w ∈ ρs(p)
• M, w |
s
= ¬ψ iff M, w 6|
s
= ψ
• M, w |
s
= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff M, w |
s
= ψ1 or M, w |
s
= ψ2
• if σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s then M, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iff there exists (w1, . . . , wn) ∈
Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn such that Rσww1 . . . wn and M, wi |
si= φi for any i ∈ [n].
We note that:
(1) When σ ∈ Σλ,s we have M, w |
s
= σ iff w ∈ Rσ.
(2) For σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s we haveM, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn) iffRσww1 . . . wn implies
M, wi |
si= φi for some i ∈ [n] for any (w1, . . . , wn) ∈Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn
In this section we study the local deduction, while the global one will be
investigated in Section 3. Note that in our sorted setting the local approach im-
plies that the set of hypothesis and the conclusion have the same sort. Therefore
we explicitly write the sort in the definition of the local deduction.
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Definition 2.4. Let s ∈ S, φ ∈ Forms and assume M is an (S,Σ)-model. We
say that φ is universally true in M, and we denote M |
s
= φ, if M, w |
s
= φ for
all w ∈ Ws. If Φs ⊆ Forms, M |
s
= Φs is defined as usual. We say that Φs is
satisfiable if there is a model M and w ∈ Ws such that M, w |
s
= Φs.
Assume that C is a class of frames or a class of models. If s ∈ S and
Φs ∪ {φ} ⊆ Forms then we say that φ is a local semantic consequence of Φs
over C, and we write Φs |
s
=C φ if M, w |
s
= Φs implies M, w |
s
= φ for any (S,Σ)-
model M from C and for any w ∈Ws (we simply denote Φs |
s
= φ when C is the
class of all frames).
2.2 The deductive system
Recall that in our setting any variable uniquely determines its sort, and the sort
of a formula is uniquely determined by the sorts of its variables. Consequently,
the uniform substitution is S-sorted, meaning that a variable of sort s ∈ S will
be uniformly replaced only by a formula of the same sort. Moreover, for any
theorem of classical logic, there exists a corresponding one in Forms for any
sort s ∈ S.
We now define K(S,Σ), a generalization of the modal system K (see [1] the
the mono-sorted version). Hence K(S,Σ) = {Ks}s∈S is the least S-sorted set of
formulas with the following properties:
(a0) for any s ∈ S, if α ∈ Forms is a theorem in classical logic, then α ∈ Ks,
(a1) the following formulas are in Ks
(Kiσ) σ
(ψ1, . . . , φ→ χ, . . . , ψn)→
→ (σ(ψ1, . . . , φ, . . . , ψn)→ σ(ψ1, . . . , χ, . . . , ψn))
(Dualσ) σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)↔ ¬σ(¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn) for any n ≥ 1, i ∈ [n],
σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s,ψs1 ∈ Forms1 , . . ., ψsn ∈ Formsn and φ, χ ∈ Formsi .
The deduction rules are Modus Ponens and Universal Generalization:
(MPs)
φ φ→ ψ
ψ
where s ∈ S and φ, ψ ∈ Forms
(UGiσ)
φ
σ(ψs1 , . . . ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . . , ψsn)
where n ≥ 1, σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s,
i ∈ [n], σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s, ψs1 ∈ Forms1 , . . ., ψsn ∈ Formsn and φ ∈ Formsi
(the n-place operator σ is associated with n generalization rules).
Since (S,Σ) is fixed, we simply write K instead of K(S,Σ).
Definition 2.5. Let Λ ⊆ FormS be an S-sorted set of formulas. The normal
modal logic defined by Λ is KΛ = {KΛs}s∈S where
KΛs := Ks ∪ {λ
′ ∈ Forms | λ
′ is obtained by uniform substitution
applied to a formula λ ∈ Λs}
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In the sequel we assume Λ ⊆ Forms is an S-sorted set of formulas and we
investigate the normal modal logic KΛ. Note that, in our approach, a logic is
defined by its axioms.
Definition 2.6. Assume that n ≥ 1, s1, . . . , sn ∈ S and φi ∈ Formsi for any
i ∈ [n]. The sequence φ1, . . . , φn is a KΛ-proof for φn if, for any i ∈ [n], ϕi is
in KΛsi or ϕi is inferred from ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1 using modus ponens and universal
generalization. If φ has a proof in KΛ then we say that φ is a theorem and we
write | s
KΛ
φ where s is the sort of φ.
Proposition 2.7. Let σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s, i ∈ [n], ϕ, φ ∈ Formsi and ψsj ∈ Formsj
for any j ∈ [n]. The following hold:
(i) |si
KΛ
φ→ ϕ implies
| s
KΛ
σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)→ σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕ, ψi+1, . . .)
(ii) | s
KΛ
σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ ∧ ϕ, ψi+1, . . .)↔
↔ (σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .) ∧ σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕ, ψi+1, . . .))
(iii) | s
KΛ
σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ ∨ ϕ, ψi+1, . . .)↔
↔ (σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .) ∨ σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕ, ψi+1, . . .))
(iv) |si
KΛ
φ↔ ϕ implies
| s
KΛ
σ(. . . , ψi−1, φ, ψi+1, . . .)↔ σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕ, ψi+1, . . .)
Remark 2.8. As in the mono-sorted case, the logic KΛ can be defined replacing
(K) and (Dual) with
σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)↔⊥s iff ψi =⊥si for some i ∈ [n]
σ(ψ1, . . . , φ ∨ ϕ, . . . , ψn)↔ (σ(ψ1, . . . , φ, . . . , ψn) ∨ σ(ψ1, . . . , ϕ, . . . , ψn))
and (UG) with
|si
KΛ
φ→ ϕ implies | s
KΛ
σ(ψ1, . . . , φ, . . . , ψn)→ σ(ψ1, . . . , ϕ, . . . , ψn)
for any n ≥ 1, i ∈ [n], σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s, ψs1 ∈ Forms1 , . . ., ψsn ∈ Formsn ,
φ, χ ∈ Formsi
Definition 2.9. If s ∈ S, Φs ⊆ Forms and φ ∈ Forms then we say that
φ is locally provable from Φs in KΛ, and we write Φs |
s
KΛ
φ, if there are
φ1, . . . , φn ∈ Φs such that |
s
KΛ
(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn)→ φ.
Note that, apart from the usual features of local deduction, in our setting
locality also implies all the hypothesis and the conclusion must have the same
sort. We can state now the local version of the deduction theorem. The proof
is an easy generalization of its analogue from classical logic.
Theorem 2.10. (Local deduction theorem for KΛ)
Φs |
s
KΛ
ϕ→ ψ iff Φs ∪ {ϕ}s |
s
KΛ
ψ
for any s ∈ S and Φs ∪ {ϕ, ψ} ⊆ Forms.
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Let C be a class of frames or a class of models and define
Taut(C) = {Taut(C)s}s∈S,
Taut(C)s = {ϕ ∈ Forms | M |
s
= ϕ for any M ∈ C}
We say that KΛ is sound with respect to C if KΛ ⊆ Taut(C).
Proposition 2.11. (The soundness of the local deduction) Let C be a class of
frames or a class of models such that Λ ⊆ Taut(C). If s ∈ S, Φs ⊆ Forms and
φ ∈ Forms then Φs |
s
KΛ
φ implies Φs |
s
=C φ.
Proof. Let M = (W , {Rσ}σ∈Σ, V ) be a model from C. We only prove that the
generalization rule (UGiσ) is sound. To prove this, we assume that σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s,
i ∈ [n] and φ ∈ Formsi such that M, u |
si=C φ for any u ∈ Wsi . Hence for
any w ∈ Ws and (u1, . . . , un) ∈Ws1 × · · · ×Wsn such that Rσwu1 . . . un we
have M, ui |
si=C φ, which means that M, w |
s
=C σ
(ψ1, . . . , φ, . . . ψn) for any
ψ1, . . . , ψi−1, ψi+1, . . . , ψn of appropriate sorts.
As a corollary we get: the (S,Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic K is sound
with respect to the class of all (S,Σ)-frames.
2.3 Canonical model. Completeness.
Following closely the approach from [1], in order to define the canonical models
and to prove the completeness theorem, we need to study the consistent sets.
For any s ∈ S, we say that the set Φs ⊆ Forms is (locally) KΛ-inconsistent
if Φs |
s
KΛ
⊥s and it is (locally) KΛ-consistent otherwise.
In the sequel by consistent we mean locally consistent. We analyze the global
consistency in Section 3.
Remark 2.12. As in classical logic, one can easily prove the following.
(1) A set Φs ∪ {ϕ}s ⊆ Forms is KΛ-inconsistent if and only if Φs |
s
KΛ
¬ϕ.
(2) Assume KΛ is sound with respect to C. We further assume s ∈ S and
Φs ⊆ Forms such that Φs is satisfiable on some model from C. Then Φs
is KΛ-consistent.
In the sequel we assume C is a class of frames or a class of models.
We say that KΛ is complete with respect to C if Taut(C) ⊆ KΛ. We say
that KΛ is strongly complete with respect to C if
Φs |
s
=C ϕ implies Φs |
s
KΛ
ϕ for any s ∈ S and Φs ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Forms.
The next result is a straightforward generalization of [1, Proposition 4.12].
Proposition 2.13. The following are equivalent:
(i) KΛ is strongly complete with respect to C,
(ii) any KΛ-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some model from C.
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As usual, the maximal consistent sets of formulas are a main ingredient in
defining the canonical model. In the local approach maximality is defined within
a particular sort s ∈ S: a set of formulas Φs ⊆ Forms is maximalKΛ-consistent
if it is a maximal element in the set of all KΛ-consistent sets of formulas of sort
s ordered by inclusion.
Remark 2.14. In the mono-sorted setting, any maximal consistent set is closed
to deduction. The same happens in our many-sorted approach: if Φs ⊆ Forms
is a maximal KΛ-consistent set then
Φs |
s
KΛ
ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Φs.
The well-known properties of the maximal consistent sets hold in our setting,
as well as the Lindenbaum’s Lemma. For any sort s ∈ S, the proof is similar with
the proof for the classical propositional logic, therefore we state them without
proofs.
Lemma 2.15. If s ∈ S and Φs ⊆ Forms is maximal KΛ-consistent then the
following properties hold for any ϕ, ψ ∈ Forms:
(i) if ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φs, then ψ ∈ Φs
(ii) KΛs ⊆ Φs
(iii) ϕ ∈ Φs or ¬ϕ ∈ Φs
(iv) ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Φs if and only if ϕ ∈ Φs and ψ ∈ Φs.
Lemma 2.16. (Lindenbaum’s Lemma) If s ∈ S and Φs ⊆ Forms is a KΛ-
consistent set of formulas then there is a maximal KΛ-consistent set Φ+s such
that Φs ⊆ Φ+s .
In order to prove that any consistent set is satisfiable, we define the canonical
model. Recall that (S,Σ) is a fixed many-sorted signature, P is an S-sorted set
of propositional variables and our logic is KΛ.
Definition 2.17. The canonical model is MKΛ = (WKΛ, {RKΛσ }σ∈Σ, V
KΛ)
defined as follows:
(1) for any s ∈ S, WKΛs = {Φ ⊆ Forms | Φ is maximal KΛ-consistent},
(2) for any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s, w ∈W
KΛ
s , u1 ∈W
KΛ
s1
, . . . , un ∈ WKΛsn we define
RKΛσ wu1 . . . un iff (ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ u1 × · · · × un implies σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ w
(3) V KΛ = {V KΛs }s∈S is the valuation defined by
V KΛs (p) = {w ∈W
KΛ
s |p ∈ w} for any s ∈ S and p ∈ Ps.
Lemma 2.18. If s ∈ S, φ ∈ Forms, σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s and w ∈ W
KΛ
s then the
following hold:
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(i) RKΛσ wu1 . . . un iff for any formulas ψ1, . . . ψn, σ
(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ w implies
ψi ∈ ui for some i ∈ [n].
(ii) If σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ w then for any i ∈ [n] there is ui ∈ WKΛsi such that
ψ1 ∈ u1, . . ., ψn ∈ un and RKΛσ wu1 . . . un.
(iii) MKΛ, w |
s
= φ if and only if φ ∈ w.
Proof. Note that (ii) from the above result is the analogue of the Existence
Lemma and (iii) is the analogue of the Truth Lemma from [1, Chapter 4.2].
Let s ∈ S, φ ∈ Forms, σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s and w ∈W
KΛ
s .
(i) Assume that σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s and let ψ1, . . . , ψn be formulas of sorts s1, . . . , sn,
respectively. Suppose that RKΛσ wu1 . . . un and σ
(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ w. As-
sume that ψi 6∈ ui for all i ∈ [n]. Note that ui is a maximal consistent set
of sort si for any i ∈ [n]. By Lemma 2.15 we get ¬ψi ∈ ui for all i ∈ [n],
which means that σ(¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn) ∈ w. Using again Lemma 2.15 it fol-
lows that ¬σ(¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn) 6∈ w, so σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) 6∈ w, contradiction
with the hypothesis.
For the converse implication, let (ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ u1 × · · · × un, and assume
that σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) 6∈ w. Using Lemma 2.15, we infer that ¬σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈
w, so σ(¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn) ∈ w. From hypothesis, there is i ∈ [n] such that
¬ψi ∈ ui. Hence, for some i ∈ [n], ψi ∈ ui and ¬ψi ∈ ui, which contradicts
the fact that ui is consistent. Consequently, (ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ u1 × · · · × un
implies σ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) ∈ w, so RKΛσ wu1 . . . un.
(ii) The proof is similar with [1, Lemma 4.26].
(iii) We make the proof by structural induction on φ.
-) MKΛ, w |
s
= p iff w ∈ V KΛs (p) iff p ∈ w;
-) MKΛ, w |
s
= ¬φ, if and only if MKΛ, w 6|
s
= φ iff φ 6∈ w (inductive
hypothesis) iff ¬φ ∈ w (maximalKΛ-consistent set Proposition 2.15);
-) MKΛ, w |
s
= φ∨ψ iffMKΛ, w |
s
= φ orMKΛ, w |
s
= ψ iff φ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w
(inductive hypothesis) iff φ ∨ ψ ∈ w;
-) let σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s and φ = σ(φ1, . . . , φn); thenM
KΛ, w |
s
= σ(φ1, . . . , φn)
if and only if for any i ∈ [n] there exists wi ∈ WKΛsi such that
MKΛ, wi |
si= φi and RKΛσ ww1 . . . wn. Using the induction hypothesis
we get φi ∈ wi for any i ∈ [n]. Since RKΛσ ww1 . . . wn, by definition
we infer that φ ∈ w. Conversly, suppose σ(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ w. Us-
ing (ii), for any i ∈ [n] there is ui ∈ WKΛsi such that φ1 ∈ u1, . . .,
φn ∈ un and RKΛσ wu1 . . . un. Using the induction hypothesis we get
MKΛ, ui |
s
= φi for any i ∈ [n], so MKΛ, w |
s
= φ.
We can now prove that the local deduction is complete.
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Theorem 2.19. (Canonical model theorem) For any s ∈ S, if Φ ⊆ Forms is
KΛ-consistent then it is satisfiable over the canonical model MKΛ.
Proof. Let s ∈ S, Φ ⊆ Forms a KΛ-consistent set and w ⊆ Forms a maximal
KΛ-consistent set such that Φ ⊆ w. Hence MKΛ, w |
s
=KΛ φ for any φ ∈ Φ, so
Φ is satisfiable over the canonical model.
The above result asserts that, for any Λ ⊆ Form the normal modal logic
KΛ is complete with respect to the canonical model.
Theorem 2.20. (Completeness of K) The (S,Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic
K is strongly complete with respect to the class of all (S,Σ)-frames, i.e. for any
s ∈ S, φ ∈ Forms and Φs ⊆ Forms,
Φs |
s
K
φ if and only if Φs |
s
= φ.
Proof. It follows by Theorem 2.19 and Proposition 2.13.
3 Global deduction for MLS
In this section we study the global deduction that is especially relevant in our
setting: in this case the set of hypothesis is an arbitrary S-sorted set. Note
that for local deduction we use | s and |
s
= when the set of hypotheses and
the conclusion are of sort s ∈ S, while for global deduction we use ⊢ and |=
meaning that the set of hypothesis may be an arbitrary S-sorted set (the sort of
conclusion is uniquely determined in a particular context). We study the global
deduction from a syntactic and semantic point of view, we prove a completeness
theorem and a general form of the deduction theorem.
In the following Λ,Γ ⊆ Form are S-sorted sets of formulas: Λ is the set of
axioms and we study the deduction from Γ in KΛ.
Definition 3.1. If M is an (S,Σ)-model such that M |
s
= Γs for any s ∈ S then
we say that M is a model for Γ, and we write M |= Γ.
Let s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms. We say that φ is a global semantic consequence
of Γ in KΛ, and we write Γ |=KΛ φ, if M |= Γ implies M |
s
= φ for any model
M such that M |= KΛ.
Let s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms. We say that φ is a global sintactic consequence
of Γ in KΛ, and we write Γ |
KΛ
φ, if there exists a sequence φ1, . . . , φn such
that φn = φ and, for any i ∈ [n], φi ∈ Formsi is an axiom or φi ∈ Γsi or it
is inferred from φ1, . . . , φi−1 using (MPsi) and (UG
k
σ) for some σ ∈ Σt1...tmi ,si
and k ∈ [mi].
One can easily see that the global deduction is sound:
Proposition 3.2. For any Γ ⊆ Form, s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms
Γ |
KΛ
φ implies Γ |=KΛ φ
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Inspired by similar results in the mono-sorted setting (see e.g. [8, Chapter
3.1]) we analyze the relation between local and global deduction from syntactic
point of view. Let Γ ⊆ Form be an S-sorted set of formulas. We denote
ΓG =
⋃
k Γ
k where {Γk}k is an increasing sequence of S-sorted sets of formulas,
defined as follows:
Γ0 = Γ, Γk+1s = Γ
k
s ∪
{
σ(ψs1 , . . . , ψsi−1 , γ, ψsi+1 . . . , ψsn) | i ∈ [n],
σ ∈ Σs1···sn,s, γ ∈ Γ
k
si
}
.
Proposition 3.3. If φ ∈ Forms for some s ∈ S and Γ ⊆ Form,
Γ |
KΛ
φ iff ΓGs |
s
KΛ
φ.
Proof. All deductions are in KΛ, so we simply write | s and | for local and
global deduction, respectively. Assume that Γ | φ and let φ1, . . . , φn be a
global proof of φ from Γ. We prove that ΓGs |
s φi by induction on i ≤ n.
If i = 1 then φ ∈ Γs. For the induction step, we analyze only the case when
φi is derived using the deduction rules:
Case 1. if φj = φk → φi for some j, k < i then ΓGs |
s φk and ΓGs |
s φj ; since
the local deduction is closed to modus ponens we get ΓGs |
s φi;
Case 2. φi = σ
(ψ1, . . . , ψl−1, φj , ψl+1 . . . , ψm) for some j < i, σ ∈ Σ and
ψ1, . . . , ψm of appropriate sorts. Using the induction hypothesis ΓGsj |
sj φj , so
there are γ1, . . . , γk ∈ ΓGsj such that |
sj γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γk → φj . We infer that
σ(ψs1 , . . . , ψsi−1 , γk′ , ψsi+1 . . . , ψsp) ∈ ΓGs for any k
′ ∈ [k]. By Proposition
2.7(ii) we get ΓGs |
s σ(ψ1, . . . , ψl−1, φj , ψsl+1 . . . , ψm), so ΓGs |
s φ.
The other implication is obvious.
As a direct consequence we get the following.
Corollary 3.4. (Global deduction theorem I) If ϕ, ψ ∈ Forms for some s ∈ S
and Γ ⊆ Form then Γ |
KΛ
ϕ→ ψ iff ΓGs ∪ {ϕ} |
s
KΛ
ψ.
In the sequel we state another form of the deduction theorem. To do this
we introduce further notations: for any s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ Forms we define {ϕ}
S
by {ϕ}Ss = {ϕ} and {ϕ}
S
t = ∅ for t ∈ S \ {s}. Moreover, {ϕ}G is ({ϕ}
S)G.
Theorem 3.5. (Global deduction theorem II) If ϕ, φ ∈ Forms for some s ∈ S
and Γ ⊆ Form then the following are equivalent:
(i) Γ ∪ {ϕ}S |
KΛ
φ
(ii) Γ |
KΛ
ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → φ for some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ {ϕ}Gs.
Proof. All deductions are in KΛ, so we simply write | s and | for local and
global deduction, respectively. We note that Γ ∪ {ϕ}S | {ϕ}G, so (ii) implies
(i) is straightforward.
We assume now that Γ∪{ϕ}S | φ, so there exists γ1, . . . , γm a global proof
of φ from Γ ∪ {ϕ}S. By induction on i ∈ [m] we prove
Γ | ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → γi for some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ {ϕ}Gsi
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where si is the sort of γi. For m = 1 we consider two cases:
Case 1. if γ1 ∈ Γ or γ1 is an axiom then the conclusion is obvious;
Case 2. if γ1 ∈ {ϕ}G then Γ | γ1 → γ1 is true.
For the induction step, we only analyze the case when γi is derived using the
deduction rules:
Case 3. if γk = γj → γi with j, k < i then we can find ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ [ϕ]G
and l ∈ [n] such that Γ | ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕl → γj and Γ | ϕl ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → γk.
Using Proposition 3.3 we consider local deduction on the sort si and we can
use the theorems of classical propositional logic on si. It follows that that
Γ | ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → γi.
Case 4. let γi = σ
(ψ1, . . . , ψl−1, γj , ψl+1, . . . , ψm) where j < i, σ ∈ Σ and
ψ1, . . . , ψm have appropriate sorts; using the induction hypothesis and the uni-
versal generalization we get
Γ | σ(ψ1, . . . , ψl−1, ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → γj , ψl+1, . . . , ψm);
for some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ {ϕ}Gsj where sj is the sort of γj . Using Proposition 3.3
we consider local deduction on the sort si of γi, so we can use Proposition 2.7
and (K lσ) in order to infer that
ΓGsi |
si σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕ1, ψi+1, . . .) ∧ . . . ∧ σ(. . . , ψi−1, ϕn, ψi+1, . . .)→ γi
Since ϕk ∈ {ϕ}Gsj we get σ
(. . . , ψi−1, ϕk, ψi+1, . . .) ∈ ΓGsi for any k ∈ [n] and
we use again Proposition 3.3 to get the desired conclusion.
In the sequel we make preliminary steps towards proving a global complete-
ness theorem. To do this we define the global consistency as follows: an S-sorted
set Γ ⊂ Form is globally inconsistent in KΛ if Γ |
KΛ
⊥s for some s ∈ S and
globally consistent otherwise.
The next definition is a straightforward generalization of [1, Definition 2.5].
Definition 3.6. If M = (W ,R, ρ) and M′ = (W ′,R′, ρ′) are (S,Σ)-models we
say that M′ is a submodel of M if W ⊆ W ′, R′σ is the restriction of Rσ for
any σ ∈ Σ and ρ′s(p) = ρs(p) ∩W
′
s for any s ∈ S and p ∈ Ps. We say that the
submodel M′ is a generated (S,Σ)-submodel of M if for any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s
w ∈ W ′s and Rσww1 . . . wn implies w1 ∈ W
′
s1
, . . . , wn ∈ W ′sn
If X ⊆ W is an S-sorted subset, the submodel generated by X is the smallest
(with respect to inclusion) generated submodel of M that includes X .
Theorem 3.7. If the S sorted set Γ ⊆ Form is globally consistent in KΛ, then
there exists a model of KΛ that is also a model from Γ.
Proof. We follow the proof of [8, Proposition 3.1.3]. Since Γ is globally consistent
in KΛ, by Proposition 3.3, ΓGs is KΛ-consistent for any s ∈ S, so we define
WΓs = {Φs ⊆ Forms | Φs is maximal KΛ-consistent,ΓGs ⊆ Φ}.
LetMΓ be the submodel of the canonical modelMKΛ generated byWΓ = {WΓs }s∈S .
It follows that MΓ is a KΛ-model and MΓ |= Γ.
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Note that the global consistency is particularly interesting in a many-sorted
setting and it is affected by the way sorts are connected through operations.
4 Algebraic semantics for MLS
In this section we add an algebraic perspective to our logic. Since the boolean
algebras with operators (BAO) and the complex algebras are the structures of
the polyadic modal logic, we define their many-sorted versions. Therefore, we
introduce the many-sorted boolean algebras with operators and we generalize the
Jo´nsson-Tarski Theorem. In doing this we follow closely [1, Chapter 5].
Recall that (S,Σ) is a fixed many-sorted signature.
Definition 4.1. An (S,Σ)-boolean algebra with operators ((S,Σ)-BAO) is a
structure
A = ({As}s∈S, {fσ}σ∈Σ)
where As = (As,∨s,¬s, 0s) is a boolean algebra for any sort s ∈ S and, for any
σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s, fσ : As1 × . . .×Asn → As satisfies the following properties:
(N) fσ(a1, . . . , an) = 0s whenever ai = 0si for some i ∈ [n],
(A) fσ(a1, . . . , ai∨sia
′
i, . . . , an) = fσ(a1, . . . , ai, . . . , an)∨sfσ(a1, . . . , a
′
i, . . . , an),
for any i ∈ [n].
In the above definition, N stands for Normality and A stands for Additivity.
The dual operators are defined by fσ(a1, . . . , an) := ¬sfσ(¬s1a1, . . . ,¬snan)
for any a1 ∈ As1 , . . . , an ∈ Asn .
An (S,Σ)-BAO can be equivalently defined as a many-sorted structure
A = ({As}s∈S , {∪s}s∈S , {¬s}s∈S , {0s}s∈S , {fσ}σ∈Σ)
satisfying the equations of boolean algebras on any sort. The notions of subal-
gebra, congruence, homomorphism are defined as in universal algebra. Conse-
quently, if h : A → B is an (S,Σ)-BAO homomorphism then hs : As → Bs are
boolean algebra homomorphisms for any s ∈ S.
In the sequel we shall omit the sort when the context is clear.
Our main examples are the (S,Σ)-complex algebras and the Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra of MLS .
Example 4.2. (Complex algebras) Let F = ({Ws}s∈S , {Rσ}σ∈Σ) be an (S,Σ)-
frame. For any s ∈ S let P(Ws) = (P(Ws),∪s,¬s, ∅s) be the powerset algebra
of Ws. Hence the full complex (S,Σ)-algebra determined by F is
F = ({P(Ws)}s∈S , {mσ}σ∈Σ)
where, for any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s we set mσ : P(Ws1)× · · · × P(Wsn)→ P(Ws)
mσ(X1, . . . , Xn) = {w ∈Ws| Rσww1 . . . wn for some w1 ∈ X1, . . . , wn ∈ Xn}
and the dual lσ (X1, . . . , Xn) := ¬smσ (¬s1X1, . . . ,¬snXn) is defined by
12
w ∈ lRσ (X1, . . . , Xn) iff Rσww1, . . . , wn implies wi ∈ Xi for some i ∈ [n].
One can easily see that F is an (S,Σ)-BAO.
Definition 4.3. A (S,Σ)-complex algebra is a subalgebra of a full complex
algebra determined by an (S,Σ)-frame.
Let A = ({As}s∈S , {fσ}σ∈Σ) be an (S,Σ)-BAO. For any s ∈ S let Uf(As)
be the set of all ultrafilters of As. For any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s and w ∈ Uf(As),
w1 ∈ Uf(As1), . . . , wn ∈ Uf(Asn) we define
Qfσww1 . . . wn iff for all a1 ∈ w1, . . . , an ∈ wn, fσ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ w.
The (S,Σ)-frame Uf(A) = ({Uf(As)}s∈S , {Qfσ}σ∈Σ) is the ultrafilter frame of
A. Denote F(A) the full complex algebra determined by Uf(A).
We are ready now to prove the generalization of the Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem
to (S,Σ)-BAOs.
Theorem 4.4. (Jo´nsson-Tarski theorem for (S,Σ)-BAOs) Any (S,Σ)-BAO A
can be embedded in F(A), the full complex (S,Σ)-algebra of its ultrafilter (S,Σ)-
frame.
Proof. We only sketch the proof, since it follows closely the proof for the mono-
sorted setting (see [1, Theorem 5.43]). Let A = ({As}s∈S , {fσ}σ∈Σ) be an
(S,Σ)-BAO and W = {Ws}s∈S , where Ws is the ultrafilter set of As. Using
the Stone Representation Theorem we get a morphism r = {rs}s∈S such that
rs : As → P(Ws) is defined by rs(a) = {w ∈ Ws|a ∈ w}. Note that rs is a
boolean embedding for any s ∈ S. We have to prove that r is an embedding
of A into the full complex algebra of its ultrafilter frame, i.e. we have to prove
that r is a modal homomorphism:
rs(fσ(a1, . . . , an)) = mQfσ (rs1 (a1), . . . , rsn(an)) (H)
Let w ∈ Ws be an ultrafilter of As. We have to prove that fσ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ w
iff there exist w1 ∈ Ws1 , . . . , wn ∈ Wsn such that ai ∈ wi for any i ∈ [n] and
Qfσww1 . . . wn. To simplify the notation, we fix the operation σ and we use the
notation f instead of fσ.
We prove (H) by induction on the arity of f . Assume that f is an unary
operator. Therefore, we show that
rs(f(a)) = mQf (rs1 (a))
If w ∈ mQf (rs1 (a)) there exists w1 ∈ rs1(a) such that Qfww1. It follows that
a ∈ w1 and Qfww1, so f(a) ∈ w.
Conversely, assume that w is an ultrafilter such that w ∈ rs(f(a)), i.e. f(a) ∈
w. We need to prove that w ∈ mQf (rs1 (a)), so we have to find an ultrafilter
w1 such that a ∈ w1 and Qfww1. If Fs1 := {v ∈ As1 |¬f(¬v) ∈ w} then we
prove that Fs1 is closed under taking meets. Let v, t ∈ Fs1 ⇒ ¬f(¬v) ∈ w and
¬f(¬t) ∈ w. By additivity of f , f(¬v)∨f(¬t) = f(¬v∨¬t) = f(¬(v∧t)), hence
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¬f(¬(v ∧ t)) = ¬(f(¬v) ∨ f(¬t)) = ¬f(¬v) ∧ ¬f(¬t). Since w is an ultrafilter
and ¬f(¬v),¬f(¬t) ∈ w, we can infer that ¬f(¬(v ∧ t)) ∈ w. We proved that
Fs1 is closed under taking meets. It follows that the filter generated by Fs1 is
proper, so there is an ultrafilter w1 such that Fs1 ⊆ w1. Note that ¬f(¬v) ∈ w
implies v ∈ w1, so Qfww1 it holds.
Assume that induction hypothesis (H) holds for n and let f de a normal and
additive function or arity n + 1. One can further proceed as in [1, Theorem
5.43].
Finally, we prove the algebraic completeness of for systems of many-sorted
modal logic.
Example 4.5. (The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of KΛ) For any s ∈ S the
theorems of classical propositional logic are in KΛs for any s ∈ S and the
boolean connectives ∨ and ¬ preserve the sort, so Forms = (Forms,∨,¬,⊥s)
is a boolean algebra. We define fσ(φ1, . . . , φn) := σ(φ1, . . . , φn) for any σ ∈
Σs1...sn,s and φ1 ∈ Forms1 , . . . , φn ∈ Formsn . One can easily see that Form =
({Forms}s∈S , {fσ}σ∈Σ) is an (S,Σ)-BAO.
Let KΛ be an (S,Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic defined as in Section 2.2.
As usual, KΛ determines an equivalence relation on formulas. In our setting
this relation is S-sorted: ≡KΛ= {≡sKΛ}s∈S where
φ ≡s
KΛ ψ iff |
s
KΛ
φ↔ ψ for any φ, ψ ∈ Forms.
By Proposition 2.7 (iv), ≡KΛ is a congruence relation on Form. We denote
Ls
KΛ := Forms ≡
s
KΛ for any s ∈ S and
LKΛ = ({LsKΛ}s∈S , {f˜}σ}σ∈Σ)
We denote [ϕ]KΛ the class of ϕ determined by ≡sKΛ (we simply write [ϕ] when
KΛ is fixed). Hence f˜σ([φ1], . . . , [φn]) := [fσ(φ1, . . . , φn)] = [σ(φ1, . . . , φn)] for
any σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s and φ1 ∈ Forms1 , . . . , φn ∈ Formsn . Note that LKΛ satisfies
(N) and (A) by Remark 2.8.
The (S,Σ)-BAO LKΛ is the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the (S,Σ)-polyadic
normal modal logic KΛ.
Our next goal is to prove the algebraic completeness for KΛ. Recall that
P = {Ps}s∈S is the set of propositional variables. If A = ({As}s∈S , {fσ}σ∈Σ) is
an (S,Σ)-BAO, then an assignment in A is an S-sorted function e = {es}s∈S ,
es : Ps → As for any s ∈ S. As usual, any assignment can be uniquely extended
to e : Form → A, a homomorphism of (S,Σ)-BAOs. We define Taut(A) =
{Taut(A)s}s∈S where
Taut(A)s = {φ ∈ Forms | es(φ) = 1s in As for any assignment es : Ps → As}
One can easily prove that KΛ is sound with respect to assignments in (S,Σ)-
BAOs. Moreover, the following holds.
Proposition 4.6. Taut(LKΛ)s = {φ | φ ∈ Forms, |
s
KΛ
φ} for any s ∈ S.
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Proof. It is a consequence of the fact that, by Definition 2.5, KΛ is closed to
S-sorted uniform substitutions.
If s ∈ S and φ ∈ Taut(LKΛ)s then e(φ) = [⊤s] for any assignment e in
LKΛ. In particular, [φ] = [⊤s], so |
s
KΛ
φ ↔ ⊤s, i.e. |
s
KΛ
φ. Conversely,
assume that | s
KΛ
φ and let e be an assignment in LKΛ. For any t ∈ S and
propositional variable p ∈ Pt there is ψp ∈ Formt such that et(p) = [ψp].
We can prove by structural induction that for any t ∈ S and ψ ∈ Formt,
et(ψ) = [φ
′], where ψ′ is the formula obtained from ψ by uniform substitution,
replacing any propositional variable p by ψp. By Definition 2.5 we infer that
KΛ ⊆ Taut(LKΛ). To finish the proof we note that the deduction rules are
sound with respect to assignments in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LKΛ.
Lemma 4.7. If KΛ ⊆ Taut(A) then any assignment es : Ps → As for any
s ∈ S can be uniquely extended to a homomorphism of (S,Σ)-BAOs e˜ : LKΛ → A
such that e˜s([φ]) = es(φ) for any s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms.
Proof. Since KΛ ⊆ Taut(A) we get ≡KΛ⊆ Ker(e), so we apply the universal
property of quotients.
Theorem 4.8. (Algebraic completeness for KΛ) With the above notations, the
following are equivalent for any s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms:
(i) | s
KΛ
φ
(ii) [φ]KΛ = [⊤s]KΛ in LKΛ
(iii) es(φ) = 1s in As for any (S,Σ)-BAO A such that KΛ ⊆ Taut(A) and any
assignment e in A.
Proof. (i)⇔ (ii) We have | s
KΛ
φ iff φ ≡s
KΛ ⊤s for any s ∈ S.
(ii) ⇔ (iii) One implication follows by Proposition 4.6. For the other, assume
A is an (S,Σ)-BAO and e is an assignment in A. Let e˜ : LKΛ → A be the
homomorphism defined in Lemma 4.7. Hence es(φ) = e˜s([φ]) = e˜s([⊤s]) = 1s in
As. Note that, for the last equality, we used the fact that e˜s preserves the top
element.
Corollary 4.9. (Algebraic completeness for K) For any s ∈ S and φ ∈ Forms
| s
K
φ if and only if es(φ) =Ws for any (S,Σ)-frame F = ({Ws}s∈S , {Rσ}σ∈Σ)
and any assignment e in the full complex algebra F.
Proof. It follows by Theorems 4.8, 4.4 and the fact that K ⊆ Taut(F) for any
full complex algebra F.
5 Related logical systems
Traditionally, program verification within modal logic, as showcased by dy-
namic logic [4], is following the mainstream axiomatic approach proposed by
Hoare/Floyd [6, 3]. More recently, Ros¸u [12] proposed matching logic and reach-
ability logic as an alternative way to prove program correctness, using directly
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the (executable) operational semantics of a language. The completeness theo-
rem for matching logic is proved using a interpretation in the first-order logic
with equality. The starting point of our investigation was the representation of
the (mono-sorted) polyadic modal logic as a particular system of matching logic
in [12, Section 8]. Our initial goals were: to understand the propositional part
of matching logic, to give a self-contained proof of the completeness theorem, to
identify the algebraic theory and to investigate the relation with modal logic.
The many-sorted system K is an initial step in this direction.
Matching logic, defined in [12], is a many-sorted first-order logic for program
specification and verification (see Appendix B for a brief presentation). The
formulas of Matching logic are called patterns. Semantically, a pattern is inter-
preted as a set of elements, with the restriction that variables are interpreted
as singletons. A sound and complete system of axioms is defined in [12], the
completeness being proved by translation in pure first-order logic with equality.
As shown in [12], classical propositional logic, pure predicate logic, separation
logic can be seen as instances of Matching logic. In [12, Section 8] the (mono-
sorted) polyadic modal logic is represented as a particular system of Matching
logic. This was the starting point of our investigation.
Let (S,Σ) be a many-sorted signature. A Matching logic (S,Σ)-model is
M = ({Ms}s∈S , {σM}σ∈Σ) where σM : Ms1 × . . .×Msn → P(Ms) for any σ ∈
Σs1...sn,s. For σ ∈ Σs1...sn,s we define Rσ ⊆Ms1 × · · · ×Msn by Rσww1 . . . wn
iff w ∈ σM (w1, . . . , wn). HenceM = ({Ms}s∈S, {Rσ}σ∈Σ) is an (S,Σ)-frame so
we consider M = ({P(Ms)}s∈S , {mσ}σ∈Σ) the full complex algebra determined
by M. One can easily see that mσ = σ˜M for any σ ∈ Σ, where σ˜M is uniquely
defined by σM (note that in [12, Definition 2.2] σ˜M is identified with σM ).
Remark 5.1. To any Matching logic model we can associate an (S,Σ)-frame
and vice versa.
Note that the variables of Matching logic are always interpreted as singletons,
while our propositional variables have arbitrary values. Let (S,ΣP ) be the
signature obtained by adding a constant operation symbol for any propositional
variables p ∈ Ps and for any s ∈ S. Hence any formula in our (S,Σ)-polyadic
modal logic is a formula in Matching logic over (S,ΣP ).
The relation between the many-sorted polyadic modal logic developed in this
paper and Matching logic can be summarized as follows:
• the system K presented in this paper can be seen as the propositional
counterpart of Matching logic,
• the system K offers direct proofs for various types of completeness results,
• by Remark 5.1 and Corollary 4.9, the algebraic theory of Matching logic
is the theory of many-sorted Boolean algebras with operators,
• the variables of Matching logic are similar with the state variables in hybrid
modal logic, so our conjecture is that Matching logic can be presented as
a hybridized many-sorted polyadic modal logic. This will be the subject of
further investigations.
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Even if Matching logic was the starting point of our research, one main issue
was to connect our logic with already existing systems of many-sorted modal
logic.
Example 5.2. In [15] the author defines a sound and complete two-sorted modal
logic for projective planes. If we set S = {p, l} (p for points, l for lines),
Σl,p = {〈01〉} and Σp,l = {〈10〉}, [01] := 〈01〉 and [10] := 〈10〉 then our modal
language ML(S,Σ) is the modal language MLG2 defined in [15]. Moreover, if
Λ = {CJ,Dl, Dp, 4〈.〉, 4〈−〉} from [15, Definition 4.1] then our system KΛ is
equivalent with the system AXP from [15]. Consequently, all our general results
stand for AXP.
Example 5.3. The Propositional Dynamic logic with Arrows defined in [14,
Section 4] is a two-sorted modal logic. Let S = {p, s} (p for programs, s for
statements), Σp,s = {<·>}, Σs,p = {?}, Σpp,p = {•}, Σp,p = {⊗}, Σλ,p = {Id},
Σp,p = {∗}. Here • denotes the composition, ⊗ denotes the converse and Id is the
identity, so on the sort p one can define a system of arrow logic. The operation
∗ is the program iteration, while <·> and ? connect programs and statements.
In [14] the following deduction rule is considered: if φ → α and α•α → α are
provable, then φ∗ → α is provable. For the moment, our many-sorted modal
logic has only modus ponens and universal generalization as deduction rules so
one should study what happens when new deduction rules are added. However
we notice that using ∆, L,R instead on <·>, ? as suggested in [14, Section 4] one
can replace the above deduction rule with the induction axioms for iteration [4,
Section 5.5]. Even if more is needed for a complete development, such a system
would fit in our setting and would benefit of our general results.
Example 5.4. In [2], a modal semantics is given for Context logic and Bunched
logic, both being logics for reasoning about data structures. These logics are in-
terpreted into a two-sorted polyadic normal modal logic. The sound and complete
axiomatization given in [2, Section 3] fit in our development so all our general
results stand in this case.
6 A modal logic approach to operational seman-
tics
In the sequel, we take first steps in exploring the amenability of dynamic logic
in particular, and of modal logic in general, to express operational semantics of
languages (as axioms), and to make use of such semantics in program verifica-
tion.
In the remainder of the paper we develop a particular system KΛ which
uses dynamic logic in a many-sorted setting. Our goal is to express operational
semantics of languages as axioms in this logic, and to make use of such se-
mantics in program verification. As a first step towards that goal, we consider
here the SMC Machine described by Plotkin [10], we derive a Dynamic Logic
set of axioms from its proposed transition semantics, and we argue that this
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set of axioms can be used to derive Hoare-like assertions regarding functional
correctness of programs written in the SMC machine language.
The semantics of the SMC machine as laid out by Plotkin consists of a set
of transition rules defined between configurations of the form 〈S,M,C〉 where
S is a V alueStack of intermediate results,M represents the Memory, mapping
program identifiers to values, and C is the ControlStack of commands repre-
senting the control flow of the program. Inspired by the Propositional Dynamic
Logic (PDL) [4], we identify the ControlStack with the notion of “programs”
in dynamic logic, and use the “;” operator from dynamic logic to denote stack
composition. We define our formulas to stand for configurations of the form
config(vs,mem) comprising only a value stack and a memory. Similarly to
PDL, we use the modal operator [ ] : ControlStack × Config → Config to
assert that a configuration formula must hold after executing the commands
in the control stack. The axioms defining the dynamic logic semantics of the
SMC machine are then formulas of the form cfg → [ctrl]cfg′ saying that a
configuration satisfying cfg must change to one satisfying cfg′ after executing
ctrl.
Syntax
Nat ::= natural numbers
Var ::= program variables
Bool ::= true | false
AExp ::= Nat | Var | AExp + AExp
BExp ::= AExp <= AExp
Stmt ::= x := AExp
| if BExp
then Stmt
else Stmt
| while BExp do Stmt
| skip
| Stmt ; Stmt
Semantics
Val ::= Nat | Bool
ValStack ::= nil
| Val . ValStack
Mem ::= empty | set(Mem, x, n)
| get(x,n)
CtrlStack ::= c(AExp)
| c(BExp)
| c(Stmt)
| asgn(x)
| plus | leq
| Val ?
| c1 ; c2
Config ::= config(ValStack, Mem)
Figure 1: Signature
In Fig. 1 we introduce the signature of our logic as a context-free gram-
mar (CFG) in a BNF-like form. We make use of the established equivalence
between CFGs and algebraic signatures (see, e.g., [5]), mapping non-terminals
to sorts and CFG productions to operation symbols. Note that, due to non-
terminal renamings (e.g., Exp ::= Int), it may seem that our syntax relies on
subsorting. However, this is done for readability reasons only. The renaming
of non-terminals in syntax can be thought of as syntactic sugar for defining
injection functions. For example, Exp ::= Int can be thought of as Exp ::=
int2Exp(Int), and all occurrences of an integer term in a context in which an
expression is expected could be wrapped by the int2Exp function.
The sorts CtrlStack and Config correspond to ”programs” and ”formulas”
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from PDL, respectively. Therefore the usual operations of dynamic logic ;, ∪,
∗, [ ] are defined accordingly [4, Chapter 5]. We depart from PDL with the
definition of ? (test): in our setting, in order to take a decision, we test the
top value of the value stack. Consequently, the signature of the test operator is
? : V al→ CtrlStack.
We are ready to define our axioms. For the rest of the paper, whenever phi
is a theorem of sort s, i.e. | s φ, we will simply write ⊢ φ, since the sort s can
be easily inferred.
The first group of axioms is inspired by the axioms of PDL [4, Chapter 5.5].
In the following, pi, pi′ are formulas of sort CtrlStack (”programs”), γ is a
formula of sort Config (the analogue of ”formulas” from PDL), v and v′ are
variables of sort Var, vs has the sort ValStack and mem has the sort Mem.
PDL-inspired axioms
(A∪) [pi ∪ pi′]γ ↔ [pi]γ ∧ [pi′]γ
(A; ) [pi;pi′]γ ↔ [pi][pi′]γ
(A∗) [pi∗]γ ↔ γ ∧ [pi][pi∗]γ
(A?) config(v · vs,mem)→ [v?]config(vs,mem)
(A¬?) config(v · vs,mem)→ [v′?]γ where v and v′ are distinct.
Next, we encode the transition system of the SMCmachine as a set of axioms.
Apart from the axioms for memory (which are straight-forward), we follow the
rules of the SMC machine as closely as allowed by the formalism, using the same
notation as in [10]. The sort of each variable can be easily deduced.
SMC-inspired axioms
(CStmt) c(s1; s2)↔ c(s1); c(s2)
(AMem0) empty → get(x, 0)
(AMem1) set(mem, x, n)→ get(x, n)
(AMem2) set(set(mem, x, n), y,m)↔ set(set(mem, y,m), x, n)
where x and y are distinct
(AMem3) set(set(mem, x, n), x,m)↔ set(mem, x,m)
(Aint) config(vs,mem)→ [c(n)]config(n · vs,mem)
where n is an integer
(Aid) config(vs, set(mem, x, n))→ [c(x)]config(n · vs, set(mem, x, n))
(Dplus) c(a1 + a2)↔ c(a1); c(a2); plus
(Aplus) config(n2 · n1 · vs,mem)→ [plus]config(n · vs,mem)
where n is n1 + n2
(Dleq) c(a1 <= a2)↔ c(a2); c(a1); leq
(Aleq) config(n1 · n2 · vs,mem)→ [leq]config(t · vs,mem)
where t is the truth value of n1 ≤ n2
(Askip) γ → [c(skip)]γ
(Dasgn) c(x := a)↔ c(a); asgn(x)
(Aasgn) config(n · vs,mem)→ [asgn(x)]config(vs, set(mem, x, n))
(Dif) c(if b then s1 else s2)↔ c(b); ((true ?; c(s1)) ∪ (false ?; c(s2)))
(Dwhile) c(while b do s)↔ c(b); (true?; c(s); c(b))∗; false?
Our logical system is KΛ, where Λ contains all the PDL-inspired and the
SMC-inspired axioms. The general theory from the previous chapters provides
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two completeness results: the completeness with respect to the canonical frame
(Theorem 2.19) and the completeness with respect to the class of many-sorted
boolean algebras with operators that are models of Λ (Theorem 4.8). The
canonical model is a non-standard model with respect to the dynamic logic
fragment of our system, meaning that the interpretation of the c∗ operation
might not be the reflexive and transitive closure of the interpretation of c, where
c is a formula of sort CtrlStack.
Note that our PDL-inspired set of axioms does not include the induction
axiom:
γ ∧ [pi∗](γ ↔ [pi]γ)↔ [pi∗]γ
The system presented in this paper can be used to certify executions, but we
cannot perform symbolic verification. Adding the induction axiom would not
solve this problem, the system should also be extended with quantifiers. Future
research will adress this issue.
We conclude by a simple example formalizing and stating a formula which
can be proven by deduction in our logic. Let pgm be the following program
i1:= 1; i2:= 2; if i1<=i2 then m:= i1 else m:= i2
Note that pgm is a formula of sort Stmt in our logic, m is a formula of sort
Var and 1 is a formula of sort Nat. For this formula we can state and prove the
following property:
(Ppgm) ⊢ config(vs,mem)→ [c(pgm)]config(vs,mem
′) implies
|Mem mem′ → get(m, 1) for any mem,mem′ of sort Mem and vs of sort ValStack.
Which, can be read in plain English as: after executing pgm the value of
the program variable m (in memory) will be 1, and the value stack will be the
same as before the execution.
Next we simplify the program pgm to basic commands:
c(pgm)↔ c(i1 := 1); c(i2 := 2); c(ifi1 <= i2thenm := i1elsem := i2)↔
↔ c(1); asgn(i1); c(2); asgn(i2); c(i1 <= i2);
((true?; c(m := i1)) ∪ (false?; c(m := i2))
↔ c(1); asgn(i1); c(2); asgn(i2); c(i1); c(i2); leq;
((true?; c(i1); asgn(m)) ∪ (false?; c(i2); asgn(m))
In the sequel, we give the main steps of the proof, each proof being a the-
orem of our KΛ system. Note that Tranz denotes the following easily derived
deduction rule:
(Tranz) if | s φ→ ψ and | s ψ → χ then | s ψ → χ.
Proof of (Ppgm)
(1) config(vs,mem)→ [c(1)]config(1 · vs,mem)
Aint
(2) config(1 · vs,mem)→ [asgn(i1)]config(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
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Aasgn
(3) [c(1)]config(1 · vs,mem)→ [c(1)][asgn(i1)]config(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
UG(2),K
(4) [c(1)]config(1 · vs,mem)→ [c(1); asgn(i1)]config(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
A;
(5) config(vs,mem)→ [c(1); asgn(i1)]config(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
(1), (4), T ranz
(6) config(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))→ [c(2)]config(2 · vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
Aint
(7) config(2 · vs, set(mem, i1, 1))→
→ [asgn(i2)]config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))
Aasgn
(8) [c(2)]config(2 · vs, set(mem, i1, 1))→
→ [c(2)][asgn(i2)]config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))
UG(7),K
(9) config(vs,mem)→ [c(1); asgn(i1);
c(2); asgn(i2)]config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))
UG(7),K, T ranz
(10) config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))→
→ [c(i2)]config(2 · vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2)))
Aid
(11) config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))→
→ [c(i2)]config(2 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))
AMem2, UG(10),K
(12) config(2 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)→
→ [c(i1)]config(1 · 2 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))
Aid
(13) config(vs, set(set(mem, i1, 1), i2, 2))→
→ [c(i2)][c(i1)]config(1 · 2 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))
UG(12),K, T ranz
(14) config(vs,mem)→ [c(1); asgn(i1);
c(2); asgn(i2)]
[c(i2)][c(i1)]config(1·2·vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))
UG(13),K, T ranz
(15) config(1 · 2 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
→ [leq]config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)) Aleq
(16) config(vs,mem)→ [c(1); asgn(i1); c(2); asgn(i2); c(i2); c(i1); leq]
config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))
UG(15),K, T ranz
(17) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
→ [true?]config(vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1))
A?
(18) config(vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1))→
[c(i1)]config(1 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1))
Aid
(19) config(1 · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1]))→
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[asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
Aasgn
(20) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
[true?; c(i1); asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
UG(17), UG(18), UG(19),K, T ranz
(21) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
[false?][c(i2); asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
A¬?
(21’) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
[false?; c(i2); asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
A;
(22) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
[true?; c(i1); asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))∧
[false?; c(i2); asgn(m)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
propositional logic
(22’) config(true · vs, set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1)))→
[(true?; c(i1); asgn(m)) ∪ (false?; c(i2); asgn(m))]
config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
A∪
(23) config(vs,mem)→ [c(pgm)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
UG(22′), T ranz
We proved that
⊢ config(vs,mem)→ [c(pgm)]config(vs, set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1))
and we know ⊢ set(set(set(mem, i2, 2), i1, 1),m, 1)→ get(m, 1) so
⊢ config(vs,mem)→ [c(pgm)]config(vs,memf) implies ⊢ memf → get(m, 1)
which ends our proof.
Related Work. It has been shown [2] that Separation Logic [11] (as branch-logic
over the theory of maps) can be faithfully represented in modal logic; therefore
one can employ dynamic logic reasoning directly on top of separation logic.
Instead of following that approach, we here follow more closely the line of work
of Matching Logic [12], using directly the operational semantics rather than the
traditional Floyd/Hoare axiomatic semantics.
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